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Abstract: High-flying illusions on the part of the proponents and grim predictions of 
the sceptics characterize the controversy about Brexit. The article analyses five issues 
at stake for the Post-Brexit relationships between Britain, the EU and Africa with a 
focus on the Commonwealth Sub-Saharan Africa: market access, FDI, aid, security and 
partnership . The British government’s vision of a ‘Global Britain’ relies heavily on a 
reinforced co-operation with Commonwealth nations. However, most likely this would 
be possible only at the expense of the poor in Africa and elsewhere. Concerning security 
cooperation with Africa, London apparently exaggerated its defence input in order to 
enhance its bargaining position with the EU. It will be crucial for both the EU and UK 
to find post-Brexit agreements to stem irregular migration and the growth of jihadist 
groups and terrorism. In a nutshell, the analysis of these different policy field shows 
that expectations of Brexiteers and African politicians alike concerning an enhanced, 
partner-like Post-Brexit Commonwealth relationship are largely unfounded.  
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 Associated expert at the Institute of African Affairs, GIGA-German Inst. of Global and Area Studies, 
Hamburg. – The subtitle refers to a remark of an Italian Member of Parliament, echoing the thoughts of many in 
the European commission: “It does the UK no credit and no service in the wider world. I fear the British 
government is heading towards the Brexit rocks.” (Boffey, 2017a).  
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 ZANEWS, June 20, 2016. Jonathan Shapiro, pen name Zapiro, is an distinguished South African cartoonist.   
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Introduction: Brexit - an African perspective  
 
The controversial discussion on the potential impact of the Brexit, i.e. the impending 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU, Map 3, Appendix), 
by the end of March 2019 on Africa is characterized by high-flying illusions on the part of the 
proponents and grim predictions of the sceptics. Two years ago, shortly after the Brexit vote 
of June 2016, Ansorg & Haastrup (2016) published an aptly overview on major issues at stake 
for Africa, complemented by an in-depth study on the impact of Brexit on African 
Commonwealth states in October (Langan, 2016). In the meantime additional studies 
completed and up-dated this picture, including a comprehensive recent ECDPM-publication 
with contributions of several experts in their fields of study (Bilal & Woolfrey, 2018). The 
following analysis draws heavily on these publications. Nevertheless, the consequences of the 
Brexit vote will still take many years to be fully understood (Gamble, 2018). In view of the 
still highly controversial Brexit policy and the fact that neither a hard ‘no-deal’ Brexit nor a 
second referendum can be ruled out (Bellamy, 2018; Kettle, 2018), some of the conclusions 
presented in the following necessarily remain highly speculative.   
 
Of course, the suspense brought by the Brexit vote was mirrored prominently in Africa as 
well, notably by the African business community. We would be well advised to heed the 
following advice of Sangu Delle, an influential Ghanaian entrepreneur and pan-African -
investor
3
. Delle, who is representative for lots of others, cautioned that the Brexit vote was a 
warning to us all. According to him it wasn’t all about racism, reviving nationalism and 
‘splendid isolation’: “A substantial segment of UK citizens feel disenfranchised -  that they are 
not stakeholders in the new economic order. As we go about creating new African economies, 
we have to make sure that the economic systems we put in place don’t just create economic 
growth, but create shared economic prosperity.” (Eng&Delle, 2018). Quite a lot of politicians 
and businessmen from African Commonwealth countries see the UK as a big supporter of 
Africa. Without it in the EU, that support might dissipate. According to Delle, the UK has 
pushed for a lot of pro-Africa initiatives in the G8 and the EU. “It was instrumental in 
supporting development aid being allocated to Africa, and when the UK held the presidency 
of the G8, we saw debt cancellation and a lot of pro-Africa programs.” A more inward-
looking EU might not support Africa in the same way. This could be detrimental to the 
continent at large (Eng&Delle, 2018). 
 
   
Thibault, S. (2018) After Brexit 
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 Delle is member of the progressive TEDFellows program, a global network of interdisciplinary visionaries in 
their fields.  
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 Illustration - Credit: Sébastien Thibault, Eng & Delle, 2018, TED fellows.  
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Brexit: principal issues at stake for Africa in detail 
 
Different perspectives on the impact of Brexit on Africa are indicative for the international 
scholarly discussion too. Nicholas Westcott, director of the Royal African Society, for 
example, holds that ‘for Africa and other developing countries, Brexit is a golden opportunity 
to secure better access, greater protection, and more aid from Britain’ (Westcottt, 2018), 
although he admits that there are challenges. Mark Langan (2018), Lecturer in International 
Politics at Newcastle University (UK) on the other hand considers that Brexit, on balance, 
offers fewer opportunities for Commonwealth African nations’ trade position vis-à-vis 
European partners while opening up many potential hazards.  
 
In short, Brexit could bring increased ambiguity, resilience, but also new opportunities and 
investments for Africa. But what are exactly the issues at stake for Africa? 
 
 
1. The African Commonwealth network   
 
Altogether, 19 out of 54 African states belong to the Commonwealth of Nations (comprising 
53 member countries worldwide), including the by far most populous and powerful states, 
Nigeria and South Africa. English is an official language in all these countries, except 
Mozambique, where Portuguese is the community language. In Cameroon and Rwanda both 
English and French are official languages. Formally, all members have an equal say – 
regardless of size or economic stature - in order to ensure that even the smallest member 
countries have a voice in shaping the Commonwealth. (Commonwealth Network, 2018). 
However, although debates in Britain suggest that the government intends to focus on co-
operation with Commonwealth nations in the future, commerce with these nations represented 
up to now only 9% of UK foreign trade (Henköl, 2017; Stone, 2017). With Brexit London 
wants to increase this share substantially, particularly by liberalizing the markets in reducing 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade. 
 
Map 1: African member countries of the Commonwealth 5 
 
  
                                                 
5
 Gambia (West Africa, re-joined in 2018) and Seychelles, are not highlighted in the map; Zimbabwe withdraw 
in 2003.  
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Source: Gutteridge, 2016;  Commonwealth Network, 2018 
 
 
2. Better access to markets for Africa ?   
 
For most African Commonwealth countries Britain has been by far the biggest market for 
their exports (see Figure 1). Liberalized Post-Brexit trade policy should enhance the sales 
prospects for African markets even more. Even though with Brexit, Britains’ share in the EU 
market would have to be omitted, the EU would still absorb a significant share of the goods 
those countries sell. The principal trade and development arrangement between the EU and its 
former African colonies, the Cotonou agreement, in force since 2000, will expire on February 
29, 2020, i.e. about one year after Brexit. Negotiations on a future – and hopefully more fair 
EU-Africa partnership, including African Commonwealth countries, will start by August 
2018
6
.  
 
Figure 1: UK trade with Africa broken down by country (£ billion), 2004 to 2014  
 
   
Source: Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; Hardie, 2016; Office for National Statistics (UK).  
Notes: For the purpose of the chart imports shown with negative sign  
 
Within the framework of the Cotonou agreement, trade relations between Africa and the EU 
are regulated by controversial regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) imposed on 
many African countries by the EU in the past decade (Kohnert, 2015, for the West Africa 
EPA). Possibly, a majority of governments of Anglophone states shall try to re-negotiate or 
                                                 
6
 In July 2018, the African Union (AU) appointed Carlos Lopes, an internationally renowned economist from 
Guinea-Bissau and former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), 
as the high representative for the post-2020 negotiations with the European Union. The appointment, ratified by 
the Heads of State AU-summit in Nouakchott, formally opened the doors for engagements with the EU on a 
continental economic partnership agreement (EPA) (Olingo, 2018). 
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even to pull out of disputed trade agreements with the EU following the Brexit vote. 
Tanzania, for example, already discarded a proposed deal between Brussels and the East 
African Community (ECA) countries, citing the “turmoil” engulfing the EU following the 
Brexit vote and the skewed terms of the agreement. The government in Dar-es-Salaam 
indicated in February 2017 that it won't sign the ECA-EPA until it has done an in-depth 
analysis taking into account the prevailing circumstances, particularly with regard to issues 
such as Brexit (Gutteridge, 2016). This the more so, as the EPAs would hurt nascent 
Tanzanian industries. The same holds for Nigeria, the biggest African country, that up to now 
refused to sign the West-African EPA, because it wants to protect its indigenous markets and 
infant industries (Kohnert, 2015).  
 
In short, as of October 2016, only 12 African countries had implemented an EPA, and 12 
others had no EPA at all 
7
. In case of a hard or ‘no-deal’ Brexit all African countries will have 
no longer preferential access to the UK if London does not succeed to negotiate new bilateral 
agreements with African governments before Brexit. This, however, is unlikely, as the 
previous lengthy negotiation processes indicate that renegotiation will be a contentious 
undertaking. This the more so, as African governments have a long experience in see-saw 
policies since the time of the cold war. They are likely to use contradictions between Post-
Brexit UK and the EU to their advantage. For the rest, the exclusion from preferential access 
to the UK holds not just for the EPAs, but also for the EU free trade agreement (FTA) and the 
EU general system of preferences (GSP), including the duty-free quota-free market access 
under the Everything-But-Arms (EBA) initiative. Major adverse consequences are predicted 
for countries like South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya and Mauritius, for which the UK 
accounts for about 25% -30%  of their exports to the EU, notably in an event of recession in 
the UK as consequence of Brexit (Bilal, 2016; Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016).  
 
In short, immediately after Brexit, the UK will cease to have any special trade agreement with 
Africa, although London has pledged that it will maintain quota-free, duty-free access for all 
least developed countries (LDCs) to the UK market under the Everything but Arms (EBA) 
agreement (Westcott, 2018). However, London will have to get its priorities right in 
concentrating its negotiations first on the biggest Commonwealth players like Canada, 
Australia and South Africa. For the rest, Britain will probably be more selective, trying to 
focus on bilateral deals, preferentially with those African countries that are most important to 
its own economy (Bilal, 2016). Moreover, within the remaining EU, the African 
Commonwealth countries will lose the UK as intermediary and advocate. This could result in 
a stronger Francophone and Lusophone bias of the EU’s Africa trade relations at the expense 
of the African Commonwealth (Bishop & Clegg, 2018: 5). The EU on the other hand is 
unlikely to re-negotiate EPAs in near future in order to adapt it to Brexit. Last, but not least, it 
is doubtful whether the UK on its own could compete better with other  trade interests in the 
global run for Africa’s resources such as China, India, than within the EU partnership. 
 
 
3. More foreign direct investment at the expense of the African poor? 
 
On occasion of the G20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017, British Prime Minister Theresa 
May announced sweeping Post-Brexit programs to reduce the reliance of African countries on 
aid. London envisaged to increase Africa’s long-term prosperity by combined trade enhancing 
programs like ‘aid for trade’ (OECD, 2017), financial instruments (see chapt. 4), and and the 
promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa. 
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 EU-ACP EPAs. Bilaterals.org., 2018  
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The amount of UK investment in Africa, which already more than doubled between 2005 and 
2014 from £20.8 billion to £42.5 billion, was  meant to be  reinforced by Brexit. South Africa 
will remain the largest recipient of UK foreign direct investment (FDI). It accounted already 
for 29.8% of total UK (outward) FDI in Africa in 2014 (Hardie, 2016; see Figure 2). This was 
notably larger than the stock of FDI held by African investors in the UK (inward FDI), which 
stood at £3.0 billion in 2014. Industry, mining, and financial services were the main industrial 
groupings receiving British FDI, accounting for 54.4% and 34.3% of total UK FDI into Africa 
in 2014, respectively (Hardie, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 2: UK foreign direct investment positions with Africa (£ billion), 2005 to 2014  
 
   
Source: Hardie, 2016; Office for National Statistics (UK)  
 
One of the most prominent instruments to increase FDI within the Post-Brexit policy of the 
British government is the G 20 initiative ‘Compact with Africa’(CwA), although the CwA is a 
multinational initiative, not directly related to Brexit. It is co-ordinated by the German Federal 
Ministry of Finance
8
, but endorsed by the United Kingdom, the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, and the African Development Bank (Campbell, 2017). The CwA initiative is 
demand-driven and open to all African countries. Since its launch in 2017, 11 African 
countries have joined: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Togo and Tunisia. (CwA, 2018). Unfortunately, the CwA is biased and 
omits important issues crucial for sustainable development in Africa (Lay, 2017). First, the 
CwA neglects investment in education, crucial for balanced and inclusive African growth. 
Second, it fails to discuss the G20’s responsibility in creating an unfavorable trade and 
investment policy environment that harms investment in Africa. Third, it does not address the 
social and environmental risks associated with private investment. Fourth, it disregards a 
comprehensive development agenda, as implied by the 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (Lay, 2017). Moreover, the CwA makes important ideological presumptions 
which in actual fact work predominantly against the interest of the African poor, as criticized 
in detail by a tralac-report (Reisen, 2017).  
 
                                                 
8
 Together with other Africa initiatives of the German Government, such as the ‘Marshall Plan with Africa’ of 
the Ministry for Economic Development and Co-operation (BMZ), a proposal to rewrite Germany's aid 
relationship with Africa, with a focus on support for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises, 
vocational training and renewable energies.  
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In short, even if the CwA should attract substantial net investment in Africa, it would still be 
another instrument to increase profitability of private investment and to socialize potential 
losses at the cost of the taxpayer, to the detriment of the poor in Africa and elsewhere.  
 
Last, but not least, UK investment in Africa, just as the distribution of Britain’s mineral 
wealth on the continent, is restricted to a very small elite in the UK and Africa, similar to its 
infamous francophone pendant, the ‘Messieurs Afrique’ (Kohnert; 2005). British companies 
control large areas of African land enclosing key mineral reserves including gold, copper, 
platinum, coal, and diamonds (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; Kabemba 2014). About 100 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) - most of them British - have mining 
operations in 37 sub-Saharan African countries. They collectively control over US $1 trillion 
worth of Africa’s most valuable resources (Curtis 2016). British companies could be inclined 
to negotiate in future independently of perceived or real EU ethical restrictions which would 
allow these inequalities to aggravate even more (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016: 3). The ever 
increasing use of tax havens by wealthy British citizens (see below and Fig. 3, Appendix) 
might be taken as indicator of such unrestricted ethics. 
 
Complementary to increased FDI, Prime Minister Theresa May announced on the G20 
summit in Hamburg in July 2017, that her Post-Brexit government shall boost the integration 
of African countries into global financial markets. Among others she promised contributing 
£60-million for the construction of a strong and transparent African financial market. 
According to its rather elusive announcement, Theresa May wanted to stimulate financial 
innovations, to enhance the autonomy of the African banking sector, and to allocate finance to 
where it is most needed.  
 
Apart from restoring the role of private financing within the framework of British economic 
development strategy as a ‘hallmark of building Global Britain’ (DFID, 2017), London 
wanted to use the unique role of the British state for the expansion of financial markets (Price, 
2018a). Thus, Theresa May offered her African peers a strong partnership with the City of 
London in order to make the City the financial hub for Africa, among others by channelling 
private capital to former colonies in Africa and elsewhere. This understandably not without 
securing returns on that investment in creating ‘value for money’ by means of Development 
Finance Institutions (DFIs) such as London’s private equity arm, the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC) (Campell, 2017; Langan, 2016; Price, 2018a). In plain 
language that would mean blanket subsidisation of private investment in Africa by the British 
tax payer. Apart from such a doubtful policy, civil society organisations (CSOs) in Europe 
and elsewhere denounced exploitative working conditions in African countries such as 
Zambia and Kenya, financed by these DFIs. This apparently included also the use of tax 
havens to avoid paying full revenues to host countries or for money laundering (see below). 
Also newly founded ‘development schemes’, created to support British agribusiness interests 
(e.g. of Unilever, Diageo, SABMiller and Syngenta; Langan, 2016:484), are  not necessarily 
contributing to inclusive growth as pretended. The same applies to the fulsome support of the 
British Government for the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (NAFSN), utilised 
to channel FDI into African Commonwealth countries such as Ghana by improving private 
property rights, business investment climate, and by identifying land into which investment 
could be placed. The NAFSN has been assigned a prominent role in Post-Brexit ‘Global 
Britain’-plans, especially in Africa too. However, it has been widely condemned by CSOs, the 
media, and even by an European Parliament inquiry (in 2015) because of labour and human 
rights abuses, land grabbing, forcibly displacing local peasants (Langan, 2016:484-85), last, 
but not least in African Commonwealth states, such as Nigeria, Ghana, Mozambique and 
 8 
 
Tanzania.. In fact, NAFSN could be considered a Trojan horse for the corporate take-over of 
African agriculture  (Sokin, 2018)
9
.  
 
Map 2.: EU blacklisted tax havens (Credit: Boffey, 2017)  
 
  
 
Apparently, behind the ‘altruistic’ Post-Brexit rhetoric of the British government about 
assisting pro-poor growth in Africa, the fact got lost that the UK still supports a wide network 
of notorious tax havens in UK’s overseas territories, crown dependencies, and island 
economies of its former empire. Tax havens links are particularly strong between colonial 
powers and their current and former colonies. The UK has been labelled already the mother of 
all tax havens (Srinivasan, 2018). Indeed, pervasive offshore FDI affects wealthy economies 
as much as LDCs in Africa and elsewhere (Haberly et al, 2015). Offshore wealth hidden in 
these tax havens is likely to have major implications for the concentration of wealth not only 
in many of the world's industrialized countries, including Britain, but also in African 
developing countries, including South Africa and Uganda (Alstadsæter et al, 2018). The use 
of tax havens in the UK increased continuously since the 1960s, as in other industrialized 
countries (Figure 3, Appendix). The users of tax havens, where not only British investors. 
Also African politicians, dignitaries and businessmen used it to  harbour illicit gains (Map 4, 
Appendix).  British tax havens include the British Virgin- and Cayman Islands, Bermuda, 
Turks and Caicos Islands, Guernsey, Jersey, and the Isle of Man. Other former British 
colonies, but actual independent island states and notorious tax havens, like Barbados, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, St. Lucia still equally belong to the Commonwealth net. Some 
of them had recently been blacklisted on an EU list of 17 tax havens, others were listed 
                                                 
9
 NAFSN was launched in 2012 by the G8 in “partnership” with 10 African governments, the AU, private 
corporations, development organizations, and aid donors. African ‘partnerships’ involved 10 African countries: 
Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique; plus Tanzania (since 2012), and Nigeria, Malawi, 
Benin, and Senegal (since 2013). Development partners that contributed include Belgium, Canada, the EU, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. On 9 February 2018, France 
pulled out of NAFSN, because Paris considered the approach of this initiative as too ideological, involving a real 
risk of land grabbing at the expense of smallholders. This decision came just a few days after revelations of 
political manipulation and flawed methodology, revealed by the World Bank Chief Economist Paul Romer, in 
January, 2018. All this suggested that the NAFSN could be considered as a Trojan horse for the corporate take-
over of African agriculture (Sokin, 2018).  
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among the 47 additional territories which were warned by the EU in an attempt to clamp 
down on the estimated £506bn lost to aggressive tax avoidance every year (Map 2, and 
Boffey, 2017). The British government had tried before in vain to ensure those jurisdictions 
would not be screened by the EU’s tax experts. However, shortly afterwards, 7 countries 
listed, including Barbados, were again lifted from the original list of 17, under the pretense 
that they pledged to address the EU’s concerns, a move swiftly condemned by activists (AFP-
news, 23 January, 2018). Therewith, London condoned at least implicitly, more or less veiled 
connections to human right abuses, global corruption, illicit financial flows and money 
laundering. Despite EU warnings, it is not to be excluded that this support will continue or 
even be reinforced after Brexit, just as the ongoing commitment of the British government to 
neo-liberal ideologies, which at least radical economists see as a representation of British 
post-colonialism (Price, 2018a; Biyani, 2018; Bishop & Clegg, 2018). In the meantime 
however, European Council members threatened already to review whether British territories 
previously left off the EU tax haven blacklist should now be added. Apparently, this was a 
move by the EU to use this blacklist as leverage to force concessions during Brexit trade talks 
(Watts, 2018). 
 
 
4. Increased aid for Africa? 
 
The perspectives of future aid relationships of the UK with Africa after Brexit are closely 
entangled with Britain’s’ trade and financial policy. This applies particularly to London’s 
focus on ‘aid for trade’, ‘trade, not aid’, and private sector development as outlined above. 
Although Prime Minister Theresa May reaffirmed at several occasions (2017 and 2018) its 
government’s commitment to spend 0.7 per cent of GNI on aid10, it is likely that Brexit could 
bring a decrease in UK aid for Africa for the following reasons. 
 
Reinforced by revelations about aid scandals of Oxfam and other development NGOs, British 
anti-aid sentiment grow in recent years because of alleged ineffectiveness and 
mismanagement of aid. This the more so, because the divorce from the EU shall deprive the 
UK from substantial multiplier effects in relation to aid (see here and in the following, Price, 
2018). In fact, the government in London itself stated already in 2013 that by the collective 
EU aid provisions the “reach and magnitude of EU financial instruments”, which includes the 
European Development Fund (EDF), the EU's main instrument for providing development aid 
to ACP countries, “outweighs those the UK could bring to bear bilaterally”. This allowed the 
UK to focus in times of austerity on “scarce national resources on priorities elsewhere” (UK 
Government, 2013, quoted in Price, 2018:3). Thus, the British government saw the EU 
apparently as a catalyst to enhance its own aid. This all the more so, as the EU apparently 
allowed the UK to offset the challenges to its own competitiveness. In 2013, the Senior 
European Experts Group, an informal group of former high-ranking British diplomats and 
civil servants who regularly publish high quality briefing and opinion papers about EU issues, 
stated “that statistics about the strength of the UK economy, such as it being seventh largest 
economy, ‘flattered to deceive’, and that by working through the EU the UK was able to 
maintain influence and prosperity ‘in an era where the relative balance of global growth, 
population and power is moving away from the UK and Europe” (UK Government, 2013; 
quoted in Price, 2018:3-4).  
 
                                                 
10
 The UK was the first G7 country that in 2015 even  enshrined  its aid commitment to spend 0.7% of its gross 
national income (GNI) on aid every year in law (Anderson, 2015).  
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Another reason for diminishing aid could be a possible devaluation of the pound Sterling (see 
Map 5, Appendix) with a corresponding negative impact on the value of British aid in Africa 
and elsewhere. This could be aggravated by a likely fall in British GNI as direct or indirect 
result of Brexit. In view of the UK’s relatively poor growth forecasts that raise questions 
about London’s ability to meet such commitments (Bishop & Clegg, 2018:5). All his would 
impact not just on the absolute amount of aid provided, but also on the propensity of the 
government to reallocate scarce resources to domestic spending under the pressure of populist 
politicians (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; Price, 2018).  
 
Under these conditions, London would probably focus on hand selected strategic partners and 
existing bilateral ties, particularly with individual African Commonwealth states on the 
expense of the poorest African LDCs. In addition, it could broaden its range of bilateral 
partners at the expense of multilateral development cooperation of the UN
11
, World Bank
12
, 
IMF, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, etc. again with the likely 
exception of the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth family. Such a downward spiral 
could be aggravated by a reduction of overall EU development assistance, given the 
prominent role of the UK as one of the major contributors to the EU’s aid budget13 which 
would become obsolete with Brexit (Ansorg, & Haastrup,  2016).   
 
 
5. Enhanced security for Africa? 
 
The EU is up to now the main contributor to the  African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) and the African Peace Facility (APF) (Ansorg,  & Haastrup,  2016). The APSA, 
established in 2004, marked a turning point of inner-African relations in so far as it allowed 
AU member states for the first time to intervene in a third African state in case of crimes 
against humanity, such as war crimes and genocide. It depended mainly on funding from 
external resources, notably of the EU and EU member states. The APF was established in 
2004 as well on demand of African governments and financed by the EDF. It  is the main EU-
support the African Union's and African Regional Economic Communities' efforts in the area 
of peace and security with an overall amount of more than EUR 2,7 billion since 2004 (EC, 
2018a). By means of this facility, Britain had been able to contribute continentally rather than 
bilaterally to African peace and security initiatives, in using the multiplier effect of EU-
funding also for its own interest. 
 
The British government repeatedly underlined that its defence expenditure would be the 
largest in the EU, that it has the largest defence industry, and that it has contributed to most of 
the operations and missions of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Within 
the framework of the CSDP, London had been an advocate for peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention, in contrast to France, which rather favoured military interventions (Ansorg & 
Haastrup, 2016). However, London apparently exaggerated its input deliberately in order to 
enhance its bargaining position for a new Post-Brexit security partnership with the EU, 
                                                 
11
 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United 
Nations volunteers (UNV), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP).  
12
 International Development Association (IDA)  
13
 Britain was the third-largest provider of funding to the European Development Fund (EDF), behind Germany 
and France. It was one of the most important supporters of EU aid programs in Africa, both politically and 
financially. Its advocacy for  industrialized countries to commit 0.7 % of their gross national income (GNI) to 
developing countries in accordance with a 1970s UN agreement resulted in the UK becoming the first G7 
country to enshrine this in law in 2015 (Ansorg,  & Haastrup,  2016). 
 11 
 
including defence, cyber security and external migration (here, and in the following, Duke, 
2018:44-45). All in all, Britain provided just 2.3% of all CSDP missions, or 4.3% of those 
operations to which it contributed, according to data from the European University Institute 
(Florence, Italy)
14
. This was considerably less than France, and even Spain or Italy had 
supplied for civilian and military operations. Moreover, the UK did not contribute to most 
missions in Africa, apart from one. Instead, in nearly all of these, France assumed the lead. 
Only when it came to the secure the sea routes from Europe to Asia, the UK seemed to 
develop a greater interest. For example,  the UK led the personnel contributions to a regional 
maritime capacity building mission for the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean 
(EUCAP, NESTOR). Even a former UK Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee 
admitted openly that the UK’s CSDP contributions tended to be ‘more about leadership and 
diplomatic support’ than about troops (Duke, 2018:45). A similar tendency of disregard was 
to be observed with respect to UN peacekeeping missions in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2000. 
Apparently, other regions and operations, like the NATO led military intervention in Libya 
(2011) to implement a United Nations Security Council Resolution against crimes against 
humanity during the Libyan civil war, or in Afghanistan and Iraq were of greater strategic 
relevance to the UK.  
 
To sum it up, although the direct effect of Brexit on EU security operations in Africa will 
probably be rather small, it would be crucial for both the EU and UK to find a post-Brexit 
agreement for the Maghreb and Sahel countries in order to stem irregular migration, 
organized crime and the growth of jihadist groups and terrorism (Duke, 2018:46). In this 
respect, the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative of the EU could offer 
unexpected Post-Brexit opportunities. Apparently, the EU ponders to open PESCO to 
countries outside the EU, such as the (Post-Brexit) UK, USA, and Norway. This could offer 
new prospects for EU external action, especially within the framework of Europe-Africa 
conflict prevention and security operations (Darmuzey, 2018). This would be even more 
appreciated because it could prevent an identity change for the EU’s security architecture and 
its security practices in Africa, in order to avert a Post-Brexit dominance of the French 
military approach (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016).  
 
 
6. Partnership of equals or collective clientelism?  
 
Some Brexiteers and African politicians alike hoped for golden times of a rediscovered but 
deeper and partner-like Post-Brexit Commonwealth relationship. The British International 
Trade Secretary for example envisaged better free trade arrangements than the existing EPAs 
with the EU. Besides, London could use the chance to co-operate with the newly created 
African Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA), approved by 44 African governments in Kigali 
in March 2018. African governments on the other hand could use their negotiating advantage 
to press for more protection of its domestic markets and infant industries (here and in the 
following, Westcott, 2018). This might apply in areas where British products and services do 
not compete with African markets. However, it is open to question whether the UK would 
allow for less rigid tariff-rate quotas and non-tariff barriers to trade, more flexible rules of 
origin or greater protection against British exports of services, even if the British industry 
would be affected negatively. Moreover, a more liberal attitude of Britain concerning African 
imports, for example concerning quotas and non-tariff barriers, could increase the cost of 
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financed by the EU budget. 
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future trade agreements between the UK and the EU, notably if London would have to leave 
the EU customs union. And although Britain is proud of its strong bilateral relations with the 
Commonwealth network, these relations, especially with the most important African players, 
South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, have been not without tensions, for example 
concerning brain-drain from the former British colonies to the UK
15
. Last, but not least, it is 
unlikely that new and better deals both between Britain and Africa and between the EU and 
Africa (as a consequence of Brexit) would come soon as both would have to concentrate first 
on their most important global partners and competitors (Westcott, 2018).  
 
 
   
Brexit and Africa, Trade implications could be dire for Africa  
Credit: Victor Ndula  
16 
 
Under these conditions, a partnership of equals between the UK and Africa and a win-win 
situation for both sides is unlikely. Moreover, Brexit would challenge not just European 
integration but put at risk African regional integration efforts too (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; 
Murray-Evans, 2017), e.g. concerning ECOWAS, SADC, and COMESA, but also in relation 
to the newly created all Africa CFTA initiative (Ezeani, 2018). The best available strategy for 
most African LDCs, notably the smaller ones, would probably be one of patronage or 
‘collective clientelism’ (Ravenhill, 1985:3, 43; and Price 2018, who seized this concept), i.e. 
to make concessions of non-trade related issues, such as voting behaviour in the UN or other 
non-comparable assets, in exchange for better market access and protection. Thus, the 
governments especially of small African states may fall back on traditional seesaw policy they 
used already with success in outwitting global players in times of the cold war.  
 
 
Outlook : What next ? 
                                                 
15
 A long-standing issue of content is the brain-drain of high qualified personnel from  former British colonies, 
such like South Africa, Nigeria and Ghana to the UK.. In 2015 for example,  the UK was the biggest gainer of 
South African skills, taking in over 18,500 skilled South Africans, according to a 2015  report by InterNations 
Expat Insider. (Staff, 2016). Another major issue of content with repercussions up to date, was the British 
protection of Shell-BP investment during the Nigerian civil war 1969-70 (Uche, 2008). 
16
 A detailed  bio of the  renowned Kenyan cartoonist Victor Ndula, Nairobi Kenya, together with more of his  
art-work is provided by Cartoon Movement.com. 
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Brexit is not easy going. Unfortunately, many of those who voted for it in favour of a truly 
‘Global Britain’, including reminiscences to the ‘golden times’ of the British empire, last but 
not least in colonial British Africa, apparently had not thought of the scope of their decision 
sufficiently. Many voters were lured by platitudes and scare stories. African governments will 
have to adapt their relations not just with London, but also with Brussels. Therefore, African 
governments should speed-up provisions to counteract the resulting changes (Bishop & 
Clegg, 2018: 9).  
 
   
Brexit – Boris Johnson’s self-inflicted injury  
Credit: Gado, June 26, 2016 
17
 
 
The Brexiteers, like Boris Johnson, should bear in mind history’s lesson that the ideology of 
right-wing liberalism along the lines that ‘what’s good for business is good for everyone’ is 
just as likely doomed to fail as leftist social paternalism concerning immigration (Collier, 
2018). The story of the ‘betrayal’ of the Commonwealth by the precipitated EU-entry of the 
UK, often used by Brexiteers, is a myth (Murray-Evans, 2016), It only serves to impress both 
the clientele of the overwhelmingly disenchanted British poor who voted for Brexit as well as 
governments of African Commonwealth nations. Rebuilding economic incentives around 
mutual interests and reciprocity, within the framework of a humane form of globalisation, 
would be one of the big themes of future Post-Brexit relations between Britain, the EU and 
Africa (Collier, 2018; Baldwin et al, 2017). In this respect all sides concerned should heed the 
advice of Sangu Delle quoted right at the beginning: “we have to make sure that the economic 
systems we put in place don’t just create economic growth, but create shared economic 
prosperity”, which should be the Leitmotiv of future Brexit negotiations.  
 
 
  
                                                 
17
Cartoon with apparent allusion to the legendary British comedy group Monty Python and its hero’s, the Black 
Knight’s self-enhancement and self-destruction. - The Tanzanian cartoonist Godfrey Mwampembwa, pen name 
‘Gado’ “is the most syndicated political cartoonist in East and Central Africa” according to his self-portrayal.  
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Annex:  
 
Map 3: GB and the other EU member states, 2018  
 
  
Credit: Furfur, EU Single Market, Wikimedia  
 
 
Figure 3: The use of tax havens in the UK - share of wealth held by the top 0.01% since 1950 
(Source: Alstadsæter et al, 2018)  
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Map 4: Indicator of use of illicit use of wealth - Propensity to own “Panama Papers” shell 
companies (Alstadsæter et al, 2018)  
 
 
 
Notes: “This map depicts the number of unique owners of shell companies created by the Panamanian firm 
Mossack-Fonseca, normalized by 2007 GDP in billion current US$. The sample includes all the owners of shell 
companies created by Mossack-Fonseca before 2006 and active in 2007. … Note that an owner of a shell 
company can be another shell company, hence the addresses of registered owners do not always reflect the 
country of residence of the ultimate owners. To deal with this issue, we exclude owners who own more than 10 
different shell companies and owners with addresses in tax havens, both of which are likely to be nominees (such 
as other shell companies) instead of actual persons.” Source: ICIJ (https://panamapapers.icij.org ; Alstadsæter et 
al, 2018  
 
 
 
Map 5: Where the £ Sterling is more (and less) since Brexit (February, 2017) 
 
 
   
In February 2017, the pound was e. g worth much less in South Africa, Brazil and Russia,  
but more in Turkey and Egypt. Credit: The Sun (UK), Caroline McGuire, 23rd February 2017  
 
